By Sue-Ann Wayow

FLAMMABLE contents from the wax storage tank to the nitrogen/steam hose inlet and/or hydrocarbon vapour slippage from a leaking gate valve may have led to the death of Allanlane Ramkissoon.

Ramkissoon, 35, died after suffering multiple burns about his body at an explosion at the Niquan Energy Trinidad Ltd (NETL) Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) facility in Pointe a Pierre on June 15, 2023.

He died three days later while receiving burns treatment in Colombia.

Almost two years after his death, the detailed report into his death was laid in Parliament on Wednesday by Energy Minister Dr Roodal Moonilal who also again offered condolences to his family members.

The 55-page final report which was conducted by the then Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries and dated October 2, 2023, was laid in Parliament by Moonilal on Friday.

It was prepared by senior petroleum engineer and team lead Renuka Rajack, Shakola McLean, Stephenson Thomas,  Omattee Mathura and  Greer Bissessar-McPhie.

The overall findings indicate that there was a management issue with the adoption and implementation of best industry practice both from a process operations management basis as well as a Health and Safety Environment (HSE) management perspective.

Root causes for the accident also identified were: lack of knowledge, lack of skill, stress physical or mental, inadequate leadership and supervision, inadequate engineering of facility process/ equipment / safety devices, inadequate maintenance – replaced parts/equipment and inadequate standards.

Speaking to members of the House of Representatives, Dr Moonilal said, “This government, makes this statement to the Parliament in the interest of transparency and in interest of health and safety practices which are critical to the interest of the operations of companies in the energy sector.”

He made reference to a recent judgement related to the accident in which Madam Justice Quinlan-Williams concluded that the main reason the NiQuan explosion report must be made public was the overriding public interest in disclosure.

Dr Moonilal said, “I give the assurance to this honourable house that under this government, led by the Member for Siparia, the days of this culture of secrecy at the Ministry of Energy will come to an end.”

Referencing the report, Dr Moonilal gave a chronology of the events leading up to the explosion on June 15 at Niquan Energy Trinidad Ltd (NETL) where Ramkissoon, a Massy Energy Engineered Solutions Ltd pipe fitter was working.

In the lead up to the accident on June 15, 2023, the Pointe a Pierre plant was not meeting expected production rates, or product quality and there was instability of the fractionating column. It was recognised that certain elements of the process needed to be addressed.

Accordingly, the company embarked on a Management of Change (MOC) process, aimed at streamlining operations, mitigating risks and ensuring employees’ compliance with procedures.

It was recognised that the light liquids, which were passing through the heater, resulted in instability within the fractionating column and it was recommended that it go downstream of the heater instead.

A by-pass point was identified and the relevant risk assessments were reportedly done. MOC documents were in the process of being finalised and were not yet approved at the time of the accident.

In preparation for the MOC, in order to install the by-pass, the line was being purged of hydrocarbons (diesel, naphtha, wax) using nitrogen. This was to be followed with steaming of the line to remove any wax buildup that may have been present.

On June 10, 2023 the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (NGC) reduced the gas flowrate to five million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) which was used as fuel and not for processing of product.

Niquan operators noted in the period June 12 to 13, 2023 that one of the storage  tanks was exhibiting abnormally high temperatures.

On the early shift on June 14, 2023 a leak on a flange on the line that transports product exiting the bottom of the fractionating column was detected and repaired and the gasket replaced.

With the plant being impacted by the gasket blow out, resulting leak, wax spill and abnormal temperatures at the storage tank,  the ministry’s report noted that it appeared that NETL did not sufficiently monitor, evaluate and assess the work to ensure that the job was being done according to plan.

 In a meeting during the late shift on June 14, 2023, Niquan operators and contractor team determined that that there were no major activities that night and that there would be no hot works required.

The teams then undertook a review of the work carried out on the gasket in the earlier shift and confirmed that all was in order.

Concurrently a gas test was carried out by the pumps located on the lower level next to the fractionation column. No gas was detected. However, steam was verified as being on line.

At the same time a call was received from control room to begin the valve lineup to slowly introduce pressure to the repaired valve to function test it and eventually continue the de-inventorying of the column.

This required the opening of the valves in the system. Simultaneously, another team was then tasked with removing the other portion of the nitrogen hose and replacing it with the steam hose to continue cleaning of the next section of the line. The steam hose was on tier 1 of the plant and the nitrogen hose on tier 3.

Ramkissoon volunteered to remove the nitrogen hose. There was no instruction to turn off the valve prior to removal of the hose as the line was thought to be depressurised.

 Ramkissoon removed the nitrogen hose and was awaiting the steam hose to connect at the same point.

It was at 12.55 am that colleagues heard Ramkissoon cry for help and saw that he was engulfed in flames.

The fire was blocking the access ladder to the second tier. However, he was able to reach the second tier and was helped by his colleagues to the first tier.

He was severely injured but conscious and was attended to by Emergency Rescue technicians, seen by an on call nurse, transported to Southern Medical Clinic before being sent to Colombia.

To avoid a recurrence there was the venting of the fractionation column to release hydrocarbon vapours, the heater was shut down and appropriate valves were closed, the report stated.

The investigative team recognises that in addition to the root causes identified in the report, there are other factors that influenced the incident, primarily managerial in nature, which were beyond the scope of the team to investigate.

These would need to be addressed/answered by NETL’s executive management and should include:

•         Why policies/procedures/guidelines inadequacies?

•         Why did management proceed given the risks identified/ not identified by previous incidents, etc.?

•         Why was there not a safety culture in place that empowers workers to stop work?

•         Why was the design of the system inadequate?

•         Why was the risk control programme inadequate?

•         Why was communication between various levels in the organisation inadequate?

The report included a list of 15 recommendations.

“The purpose of this investigation is not to apportion blame or liability but to determine the root cause of the accident,” the report also states.