Summary

• The Privy Council has refused the Attorney General’s request for special leave to appeal compensation awards to nine men once accused of murdering Vindra Naipaul-Coolman.
• The decision ends the State’s attempts to overturn a default judgment on liability for malicious prosecution and a damages award of just under $20 million.
• The men were charged in 2007, spent about 10 years on remand, and were acquitted in 2016.
• The claim proceeded undefended after the State failed to file a defence on time; damages were assessed in January 2023.
• Each man is set to receive close to $2 million, represented by Freedom Law Chambers led by Anand Ramlogan, SC.

 

By Prior Beharry

THE Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has cleared the way for nine men once accused of murdering businesswoman Vindra Naipaul-Coolman to collect close to $20 million in compensation from the State, after refusing the Attorney General’s final bid to challenge the award.

In a decision dated February 26, the London-based court refused the State’s application for special leave to appeal, effectively bringing an end to efforts to overturn a default judgment first entered in the High Court and later reinstated by the Court of Appeal.

The men—Shervon Peters, Devon Peters, Anthony Gloster, Joel Fraser, Ronald Armstrong, Keida Garcia, Jameel Garcia, Marlon Trimmingham and Antonio Charles—were charged with murder in 2007, months after Naipaul-Coolman was kidnapped from her Lange Park home in December 2006. They spent about 10 years on remand before being acquitted in 2016.

In 2020, they filed a civil claim for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General, alleging the criminal proceedings were initiated without reasonable and probable cause and with malice. The State did not file a defence within the time required under the Civil Proceedings Rules.

As a result, in 2021, High Court judge Joan Charles granted permission for default judgment on liability, and the case moved to an assessment of damages. In January 2023, Charles assessed damages at just under $20 million after considering the length of the men’s incarceration and the impact on their lives. Each claimant—represented by Freedom Law Chambers led by Anand Ramlogan, SC—is to receive close to $2 million.

In March 2023, the Attorney General’s Office applied to set aside the default judgment, arguing improper service of the claim form, an improper exercise of discretion in granting default judgment, and an alleged lack of jurisdiction to enter judgment with damages to be assessed.

Charles set aside the default judgment after upholding the complaint of improper service. The men appealed, and by a majority, appellate judges Nolan Bereaux and Mark Mohammed allowed the appeal and reinstated the default judgment and damages award, with Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh—now Chief Justice—dissenting.

In his written reasons, Bereaux held the application to set aside did not amount to a “final decision” under Section 109(1)(a) of the Constitution and therefore did not trigger an appeal as of right to the Privy Council. He said that if the State had succeeded, the matter would simply have returned to the High Court for a defence to be filed and the proceedings to continue.

The majority also rejected the State’s argument that the case raised issues of “great general or public importance” under Section 109(2)(a), including questions around service on the State and the court’s authority to set aside default judgments. In addressing that submission, the court referred to the Privy Council’s decision in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Universal Projects Ltd, which affirmed that a court’s inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent express procedural rules.

Bereaux further criticised delays by the State, saying there was “no excuse” for allowing a claim it considered bound to fail to proceed undefended to default judgment, then waiting years to challenge it only after public concern emerged over the size of the award.

In dissent, Boodoosingh said the application to set aside could not be separated from the earlier liability ruling and should be treated as a final decision. He also considered the case raised matters of public importance because the award involved significant public funds in a malicious prosecution claim, a cause of action traditionally regarded as difficult to establish against the State.

In November, the Court of Appeal refused the State’s conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The State then petitioned the Privy Council directly for special leave, which has now been refused—leaving the default judgment and damages award intact.